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Abstract
Most contract signing protocols make use of a trusted third party (TTP) to ensure fairness. It has
been shown that in the crash network model, this is inevitable. However, for stronger networks,
where misbehavior is allowed but failure excluded, the necessity of a TTP has not yet been de-
bated. We consider a strong network model, that includes reliable broadcast, bounded delays and
timestamps and use it to describe a simple multiparty contract signing protocol that does not rely
on a TTP. This shows that by strengthening the assumptions on the network, the transfer of trust
from one dedicated server to the network is feasible. The result is commented in a more general
setting of multiparty protocols and problems. The correctness of the proposed protocol for any
number of participants is proven using process algebra techniques.
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1 Introduction
Signing a contract in real life simply requires some people in a room, a pen
and a piece of paper. Signing a digital contract amongst multiple partners
over a network, though, requires a lot more attention and well-chosen secu-
rity measures to protect against possible misbehavior or network failures. A
multiparty contract signing protocol is a series of messages that, if followed
precisely, implements this complex digital operation and ensures desirable
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properties. The most important property is fairness. In a fair protocol, either
each well-behaving participant obtains the signed contract, or nobody does.
In this paper we address two issues regarding contract signing protocols.
The ﬁrst is the presence of a Trusted Third Party (TTP). Contract signing
protocols usually rely on such a TTP, which can be contacted oﬄine or on-
line. However, a TTP is clearly a bottleneck, both in performance and trust,
and constitutes a single point of failure. Solutions without a TTP include
protocols with gradual information exchange, randomized and probabilistic
protocols, all with a non-zero failure probability. It has also been proved that
in the so-called crash network model, where connections are faulty and parties
possibly misbehaving, the problem is impossible to solve without a TTP [15].
In other, more reliable network models, the contract signing problem has not
been studied, basically because reliable networks are not considered realistic.
But in the context of fault-tolerant software architectures and coordination
middleware platforms [14,18,17], a reliable communication medium is plau-
sible. Therefore the question arises whether these generic models can take
over the functionality of the dedicated TTP, and if so, which communication
primitives are necessary/suﬃcient.
The second issue concerns the formal analysis of multiparty contract sign-
ing protocols and fair exchange protocols in general. We want to formally
prove security properties of multiparty contract signing protocols parametric
in the number of participants. Referring to the well-known quote of Roger
Needham about three-line security protocols [1], it comes without saying that
formal veriﬁcation is important in this ﬁeld. Even more so for multiparty
protocols that come with the burden of non-intuitive scheduling and state ex-
plosion. Although these two questions don’t seem related at ﬁrst, they are
subtly linked. Namely, the protocols without a TTP exhibit more symme-
try, and are therefore more likely in reach of recent parametrized veriﬁcation
techniques.
We seek to answer our two-fold question by strengthening the network to
the point where the network itself can provide the functionality of a trusted
party. So, conceptually, trust is transferred from the TTP to the communi-
cation structure. Identifying the precise point where this transfer is complete
remains an open challenge, but we give a partial solution here. The proposed
network model includes (i) reliable broadcast with bounded delay, (ii) time-
stamps, and (iii) a proof-of-send mechanism. The latter mechanism provides
the sender of a message with an unforgeable proof of delivery of the message to
the network. Admittedly, the resulting protocol is of limited practical value;
the assumptions on the network are strong. However, it shows that a TTP-free
solution for the multiparty contract signing problem exists and is, moreover,
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not dependent on the number of misbehaving parties. The proposed protocol
is also simple enough to be in reach of algebraic veriﬁcation techniques. We
manage to prove its fairness for any number of participants. The proof is of an
inductive ﬂavor, having equivalences checked automatically for the base case,
and using axioms of the process algebra μCRL to lift the equivalences to the
general case.
As far as we know, no protocol similar to the one presented here exists
in the literature. The closest related work is reported in [7]. In the context
of parametric systems, μCRL has been used before [12,16]. The proofs pre-
sented there are however not directly comparable to ours. Other veriﬁcation
techniques have been applied to small scenarios of MPCS protocols [6].
Overview We ﬁrst introduce the problem of multiparty contract signing
(Section 2), then our simple protocol (Section 3) together with a formal cor-
rectness proof (Section 4). We then discuss in detail the implications and
challenges of transferring trust from a server to the network (Section 5), and
ﬁnish with some conclusions in Section 6.
2 Multiparty Contract Signing
The informal idea of what constituted a multiparty contract signing proto-
col (MPCS protocol) and what it should achieve has broad consensus. In a
nutshell, there are N participants, some possibly malicious, who should reach
agreement on whether a contract that they’ve been negotiating will be signed
or aborted. Moreover, if it is signed, all the participants should be able to
show the signed contract to an outside observer, also called the veriﬁer. Be-
low, we describe this more formally and list the expected properties. This also
indicates how such a protocol can go wrong.
Let P1 · · ·PN be N parties willing to sign a contract c and Verifier the
outside observer. A MPCS protocol consists of two subprotocols:
SIGN (c, P1 · · ·PN) : 〈d1 · · ·dN 〉 −→ out1 · · · outN
VERIFY (Pi, Verifier) : outi −→ {accept, reject}.
The ﬁrst starts from the individual decisions di (sign or abort) and works
towards reaching agreement. The outcome is a value outi for every player Pi.
This is either the signed contract, or the abort decision. The VERIFY subpro-
tocol describes the interaction between a player and an external veriﬁer. The
veriﬁer will examine the signed contract that Pi presents and will output the
decision accept only if it is a valid signed contract. Ideally, an MPCS protocol
guarantees the following:
• Fairness : At the end of the protocol, either every signer obtains all the other
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signers’ signatures on the contract, or nobody gets all the other signers’
signatures.
• Timeliness : There exists some mechanism to ensure termination, both for
the signing and the veriﬁcation subprotocol.
• Abuse-freeness: No signer should be able to prove to an external observer
that he has the power to choose between concluding the protocol successfully
and aborting it.
As a malicious participant we consider a participant who does not follow the
protocol, but tries to make it fail instead.
3 A simple MPCS protocol
We now describe a straightforward multiparty contract signing protocol with-
out TTP in which N participants aim to sign a contract c together. The
participants are geographically distant and communicate by broadcasting mes-
sages over an asynchronous network. They know each other and it is assumed
that the discussions and negotiations on c have taken place previously, outside
the contract signing protocol. Every participant i is capable of constructing
an unforgeable signature sign(i, x) on any binary content x. This is usually
implemented via a public-key infrastructure, which is assumed to be in force
here. We follow the usual blackbox interpretation of cryptography and ab-
stract away from its details.
The network model
In order to eliminate the need for a trusted party, we strengthen the com-
munication model. In particular, there are three key features that we require
extra from the network:
• It supports reliable broadcast as communication primitive, meaning that
messages don’t get lost (although the order doesn’t have to be preserved)
and messages are delivered within a bounded delay.
• It automatically timestamps all messages with the time of the send action.
A global clock is not necessary, but we do assume that there is some loose
synchronization between the local clocks of the participants’ hosts such that
the maximum diﬀerence between two clocks is always bounded by a constant
known to all participants.
• It has the capability to provide unforgeable proofs of send to anybody who
places a message on the broadcast channel. Whenever participant i broad-
casts a message m, the network gives back to i a timestamped proof-of-
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SIGN ({P1 · · · PN}, c, Δ) −→ out1 · · · outN
• for all i ∈ {1 · · ·N}, Pi ⇒ : sign(i, c)
• for all i, j ∈ {1 · · ·N} (i = j), Pi ← : msg〈j, sign(j, c), t′〉
• Pi leaves the protocol when
· she has successfully sent and received all the messages, or
· a timeout occurs, or
· she decides to abort
• the outcome of the algorithm for Pi is
outi
def
= (outi,1 · · · outi,N ),
where
{
outi,i
def
= msg〈i, sign(i, c), t〉 or abort
outi,j
def
= msg〈j, sign(j, c), tj〉 or timeout for i = j
VERIFY ({P1 · · · PN}, c, Δ, outi) −→ accept or reject
if outi,i = msg〈sign(i, c), t〉 then reject
else if ∃j = i : outi,j = timeout then reject
else if ∃j = i : outi,j = msg〈j, sign(j, c), t
′〉 and (| t− t′ |> Δ) then reject
else if ∃j : outi,j = msg〈j, sign(j, c), t
′〉 and not valid (sign(Pj , c)) then reject
else accept
Fig. 1. The simple MPCS protocol
send which is simply an unforgeable copy of the actual network message
msg〈i,m, t〉.
Note that the network has no special knowledge regarding MPCS protocols.
It is just generic support, for example provided by the middleware, rather
than a ‘consciously’ participating party. For more comments on this model,
see Section 5.
The protocol
We will denote broadcast by ⇒ and receiving a message by ←. The proto-
col for participants {P1 · · ·PN} is described in Fig. 1. Before running the SIGN
protocol, the participants establish agreement on the text of the contract c
and on a value Δ which indicates the maximum time that a participant is al-
lowed to ponder about whether to sign or not. The value Δ takes into account
a possible skew of the local clocks.
The basic idea of the SIGN protocol is that everybody broadcasts her own
signature and receives everybody else’s signature. The network annotates all
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incoming send requests with the name of the sender and the time of send,
and seals the resulting message. It also hands a copy of the actual network
message to the sender. The protocol result for Pi is outi, which is the sequence
of signatures or timeouts of all others, plus either her own proof-of-send or
an abort. A timeout occurs when more than Δ time units have passed since
broadcasting her own signature. If all goes well, every participant has in the
end a list of messages containing all signatures, and a copy of her own broad-
casted message to prove her commitment. This will be her signed contract.
An honest participant will ﬁrst broadcast, then start receiving, and will
decide in the beginning whether her personal decision is abort or not. A
misbehaving participant can receive messages before broadcasting, can change
her mind at any time, and can declare that a timeout happened even when
this is not the case. The protocol ensures that the misbehavior is not harmful,
or only harmful for the dishonest participants themselves.
In the second subprotocol, VERIFY , a presented contract (the message ar-
ray outi) is accepted only when all the messages included are timestamped
within Δ time units from i’s proof-of-send (before or after) and all signatures
included are correct. The veriﬁer does not need interaction with the partic-
ipants when evaluating a contract. We assume he has means to verify the
digital signatures of the participants. Note that some dishonest participants
who broadcast only after receiving could still end up with a valid contract.
This does not violate the fairness, though.
The fairness of the protocol is guaranteed basically by the symmetry of the
checks that Verifier performs. Timeliness is ensured by the bounded delay,
the timeouts and the ﬁnite number of messages. Note that this protocol is
not abuse-free. Also note the following possible attack: if only a subset of
{P1 · · ·PN} send their signatures, a dishonest party can prove to the veriﬁer
that he has a contract with that subset of participants. This can be easily
prevented by explicitly naming {P1 · · ·PN} in the body of the contract c.
4 Formal correctness proof
In this section we formalize the MPCS protocol of the previous section and
prove its fairness for any number of participants. We use algebraic manipu-
lation in μCRL [11], an extension of the process algebra ACP with abstract
data types, to achieve this.
From the process algebraic point of view, everything is a process, or more
precisely, the behavior of every system can be modeled as process. The mod-
elling can take place at various abstraction levels. Typically, two descriptions
are distinguished: a speciﬁcation Spec capturing the global desired behavior
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of the system, and the implementation Imp, capturing as much as possible
from the implementation details of the system. The typical process algebraic
correctness statement is then Spec = τIImp, meaning that the speciﬁcation is
behaviourally equivalent to the implementation, after abstraction of internal
communications in I. In μCRL, processes are built from atomic actions from
a set Act and operators for sequential, non-deterministic and parallel com-
position. For any processes p and q, p + q denotes non-deterministic choice
between p and q, p·q denotes their sequential composition, and p‖q denotes the
parallel composition (deﬁned in terms of interleaving and synchronous com-
munication). Synchronization is governed by a communication function γ.
There is also an encapsulation operator ∂H , that forces processes to commu-
nicate, by making the actions in H act exclusively in communication. The
hiding operator τI abstracts away the actions in I. Finally, there are two
special processes: δ (deadlock, the unit of +) and τ (internal action). In order
to use abstract data types in a speciﬁcation, a signature of multiple sorts and
functions can be declared, and axiomatized by equations. Atomic actions can
be parameterized with data elements, as in proof(p). To model input, the
alternative choice such as
∑
x:NetMsg P (x) is used. Finally, if b is a term of data
domain Bool and p and q are processes, then the conditional (p  b  q) is the
process “p if b, else q”. There is a powerful toolset that supports μCRL [3].
Protocol Formalization
All the entities involved in the protocol are processes: the participants Pi,
the veriﬁer Verifier, and the communication medium Net. They are spec-
iﬁed in Fig. 2. We do not make a distinction between honest and dishonest
participants at the level of process description. In the trace set of every pro-
cess Pi there are both well-behaved and bad traces. An honest participant will
execute a well-behaved trace, for instance bcast(..).proof(..).deliver(..).claim(..).
The processes communicate by synchronizing on certain actions. Here are
the pairs of actions, together with the result of their communication:
γ (bcast,Bcast) = BCAST γ (proof,Proof) = PROOF
γ (claim,Claim) = CLAIM γ (deliver,Deliver) = DELIVER
Because μCRL cannot model time naturally, some choices and simpliﬁcations
are made. The most important is that we do not model explicitly the part
where a participant is waiting for the Δ time units to pass while collecting
messages, but instead we compress it in one communication step to the net-
work (DELIVER). It is future work to better accommodate the timestamps,
possibly using the technique proposed in [4].
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Pi({P1 · · ·PN}) = bcast(sign(i, c)).∑
p:NetMsg proof(p).∑
M :(∀m∈M |tstp(p)−tstp(m)|<Δ∧sender(m)∈{P1 ···PN})
deliver(M).
claim(M [Mi := p])
+∑
M :NetMsgList deliver(M).
claim(M [Mi := abort])
Net(B) =
∑
x Bcast(x).Proof(msg(x)).Net(B + msg(x))
+
timeout.NetDel(B)
NetDel(B) = Deliver(M).NetDel(B)  M ⊆ B  δ
Verifier =
∑
M Claim(i,M).
(accept(i)  check(i,M)  reject(i))
CSign({P1 · · ·PN}) = τ{BCAST,PROOF,DELIVER,CLAIM}
∂{bcast,Bcast,proof,Proof,claim,Claim,deliver,Deliver}
( Net(∅) ‖ Verifier ‖ P1‖ · · · ‖PN )
Fig. 2. The μCRL description
B, M are lists of network messages, indexed by their sender. We make
use of a function sender(x) which returns the ﬁrst element of the tuple x ≡
msg〈i,m, t〉. Bi and Mi denote the network message on the position i in the
respective lists. The μCRL syntax does not allow to pass other processes as
parameters. However, in order not to complicate matters with extra datatypes,
we abuse the notation and write Pi({P1 · · ·PN}) for the behavior of Pi when
participating in a protocol with {P1 · · ·PN}.
The proof
The fairness property states that any honest participant must be able
to prove to the veriﬁer that the contract has been signed, or else no other
participant should be able to do that. Without loss of generality, let P1 be
an honest participant and P2 be one of the other N participants, honest or
not. We have to prove that either the claim of P1 is accepted, or, if the claim
of P1 is rejected, the claim of P2 should be rejected as well. We can express
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this requirement as a system equivalence by hiding all actions in the system
except the relevant ones (viz. accept(1), accept(2), reject(1), reject(2)) and
request that what’s left is equivalent to a fair behavior:
(∀N) CSign′({P1 · · ·PN}) ∼ FairSystem
′
where
CSign′({P1, P2, · · · , PN})
not
= τ{accept(i),reject(i)|i>2}CSign({P1 · · ·PN})
FairSystem′
def
= accept(1)‖(accept(2) + reject(2)) + reject(1)‖reject(2)
and ∼ is weak bisimulation equivalence. To prove this equivalence, we ﬁrst
need a more general compositionality result for μCRL processes.
Lemma 4.1 Let ∼ be a congruence for all operators of μCRL. For any pro-
cess P , let com(()P ) denote the set of actions of P used for synchronization
with other processes. Let S, P,Q,R be any processes with A = com(S), H =
com(P )∪com(Q)∪com(R) and I = γ(A,H). Then, if γ(com(P ), com(Q)) = ∅,
γ(com(R), com(Q)) = ∅, γ(com(P ), com(R)) = ∅, the following implication
holds:
if τI∂H(S||P ) ∼ τI∂H(S||Q) then τI∂H(S||P ||R) ∼ τI∂H(S||Q||R).
Proof. We rely on some of the conditional alphabet axioms from [13], namely:
(CA1) γ(α(x), α(y) ∩H) ⊆ H → ∂H(x‖y) = ∂H(x‖∂H(y))
(CA2) γ(α(x), α(y) ∩ I)) ⊆ ∅ → τI(x‖y) = τI(x‖τI(y))
(CA3) α(x) ∩H = ∅ → ∂H(x) = x
(CA4) α(x) ∩ I = ∅ → τI(x) = x
(CA7) H ∩ I = ∅ → τI∂H(x) = ∂HτI(x)
Since τI∂H(S||P ) ∼ τI∂H(S||Q) and since ∼ is a congruence w.r.t. ||, we can
write
τI∂H(S||P )||R ∼ τI∂H(S||Q)||R. (1)
R doesn’t perform any actions from I and τI∂H(S||P ) doesn’t either. There-
fore, by axioms (CA2) and (CA4), the left side of (1) transforms as follows:
τI∂H(S||P )||R
CA4
= τI(τI∂H(S||P )||R)
CA2
= τI(∂H(S||P )||R).
We apply the same transformation in the right-hand side:
τI(∂H(S||P )||R) ∼ τI(∂H(S||Q)||R).
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Then, since ∼ is a congruence w.r.t. ∂H , we further obtain
∂HτI(∂H(S||P )||R) ∼ ∂HτI(∂H(S||Q)||R).
We have I∩H = ∅, thus from (CA7): τI∂H(∂H(S||P )||R) ∼ τI∂H(∂H(S||Q)||R).
Next, note that α(R) ⊆ H ∪ Ext(R) and α(S||P ) ⊆ A ∪ H ∪ I ∪ Ext(S) ∪
Ext(P ).
Thus γ(α(R), α(S||P )∩H) = ∅ ⊆ H . With (CA1), this means
τI∂H(∂H(S||P )||R) = τI∂H(S||P ||R).
Finally, after a similar transformation on the right side, we conclude that
τI∂H(S||P ||R) ∼ τI∂H(S||Q||R).

We are now ready for the fairness theorem.
Theorem 4.2 (∀N) CSign′({P1, P2, · · · , PN}) ∼ FairSystem
′.
Proof idea. Weak bisimulation is not a congruence with respect to + and
therefore, in order to be able to use Lemma 4.1, we will prove a stronger but
less intuitive equation, namely:
(∀N) CSign′({P1, P2, · · · , PN}) ∼BB FairSystem
′
BB (2)
with ∼BB being the rooted branching bisimulation congruence and
FairSystemBB
def
= τ.accept(1)‖(τ.accept(2)+τ.reject(2))+τ.reject(1)‖τ.reject(2)
(The silent preﬁxes are needed for the rooted branching bisimulation relation.)
The proof proceeds along the following line:
(i) It holds that FairSystem′BB ∼BB CSign
′({P1, P2}). This can be shown
by automatic equivalence checking. The two sides of the equation are
μCRL processes with ﬁnite (and small) state spaces. The μCRL toolset
can then just perform a mechanical check that the two state spaces are
indeed equivalent under the equivalence notion considered, namely rooted
branching bisimulation.
(ii) It holds that ∀i CSign′({P1, P2}) ∼BB CSign
′({P1, P2, Pi}). Similarly, be-
cause the processes involved are ﬁnite-state (and in fact, small), this
equivalence can be checked by the toolset.
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(iii) Next follows the generalization step, where we do not rely on the toolset
anymore, but on equational reasoning. Suppose
CSign′({P1, P2}) ∼BB CSign
′(P1, P2, · · · , Pi−1}).
By Lemma 4.1 it follows that
CSign′({P1, P2, Pi}) ∼BB CSign
′(P1, P2, · · · , Pi−1, Pi})
and, by point (ii),
CSign′({P1, P2}) ∼BB CSign
′(P1, P2, · · · , Pi−1, Pi}).
We thus arrive at the equation
CSign′({P1, P2}) ∼BB CSign
′(P1, P2, · · · , PN}),
saying that all the messages exchanged in the network do not aﬀect the
observable activity of participants P1 and P2. From point (i), the targeted
result follows.
5 Discussion on the absence and presence of a TTP
Above, we have shown that a reliable network model can function in place of
a trusted referee in a multiparty contract signing protocol. Now, we discuss
this result from several perspectives. First, we point out the diﬀerences in
functionality between a TTP as used traditionally and the reliable network
used here. We argue that it is diﬃcult to relax the proposed model. Next,
we present in a uniﬁed framework three problems closely related to contract
signing. We speculate on a possible solution of the problems assuming a
reliable network as deployed above and formulate some related challenges.
A TTP vs. a reliable network
Usually [5,9,2], a TTP plays an active role in a protocol: it checks signa-
tures, it is aware of the participants engaged, sometimes it maintains a history
of contacts with the participants, etc. These operations need memory, pro-
cessing power and a dedicated contract signing mediation algorithm. When
a coordination architecture is used for the this purpose, we may expect that
the communication is made reliable by transparent network algorithms. There
may be support from sophisticated interaction mechanisms in the middleware.
There may be even data storage facilities. But we cannot assume computing
S. Orzan, E. de Vink / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 157 (2006) 27–41 37
power available in the communication network. In particular, no awareness of
the existence and activity of the protocol’s participants can be assumed.
Weaker communication models?
In our search for a TTP-free contract signing protocol in a communication
model that is as weak as possible, it remains unsettled what the weakest model
is. We therefore have a closer look at the model of Section 3 and see whether
its requirements can be relaxed.
The reliable broadcast primitive can be replaced by reliable send. The
protocol would remain fair. In fact, there will be more possibilities for a
dishonest player to harm herself by doing a send without to wait for the
corresponding receive. On a side note, reliable channels are not such a powerful
thing to ask for. In the traditional communication model one also has to
assume some reliable channels hooking up to the TTP.
The time elements cannot be dropped. Without the bound on the network
delay there is no way to tell whether an expected message has been sent or
not. With the bounded delay in place, we know that a timeout means that
the expected message has not been sent. Timestamps are necessary in order
to prevent dishonest participants from holding up their signatures too long,
causing honest participants to timeout and abort, leaving the dishonest parties
with a validly signed contract.
The proofs of send can, in principle, be replaced by proofs of delivery to
obtain a more natural communication model. This would have the advan-
tage that not all channels need to be reliable, but only those on which the
acknowledgments are sent. This scheme, however, doesn’t immediately ﬁt the
broadcast primitive. Likely, it will be more complicated to analyze formally
as well.
Related problems
There is a series of well-known problems that are related to contract sign-
ing, although, from a theoretical point of view, the relationship is not com-
pletely clear. These problems are fair exchange, distributed consensus and
multiparty computation. Here, we deﬁne them formally, but in a minimalistic
way, i.e., stripped of all unessential information like signatures, secret/public
key cryptography, item descriptions etc. The participants that behave as ex-
pected are called honest, the others dishonest — regardless of whether their
misbehavior is due to bad intentions or to failures. Let t be the maximum
number of dishonest players (a bound a priori known). All the input values
are private to the respective participants. To solve the problem means to ﬁnd
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a terminating algorithm with the speciﬁed input/output behavior.
• Multiparty contract signing (MPCS)
Participants P1 · · ·PN , Verifier
Input 〈 d1 · · ·dN 〉, a veriﬁcation function check
Output 〈 out1 · · · outN 〉
Requirements (fairness) for any honest Pi, if check(outi) = false
then check(outj) = false for all participants
Verifier is always honest and its role is just to apply the function check ,
which is deﬁned on all possible outcomes.
• Distributed consensus (DC)
Participants P1 · · ·PN
Input 〈 d1 · · ·dN 〉
Output 〈 out1 · · · outN 〉
Requirements (agreement) for any honest Pi, Pj, outi = outj
(validity) if for any honest Pi, Pj, di = dj,
then for any honest Pi, outi = di.
DC is known to be impossible in the crash model, if t > N/3 or if t exceeds
the connectivity degree of the communication graph [8]. On the other hand,
solutions exist for the case t < 1
3
N (see [9]).
• Multiparty computation (MC)
Participants P1 · · ·PN , multiple variable function F
Input 〈 d1 · · ·dN 〉
Output 〈 out1 · · · outN 〉
Requirements (correctness) for any honest Pi, Pj, outi = F (d1 · · ·dN)
(privacy) di should remain private
MC has a probabilistic solution for t < 1
3
N (see [10]).
• Multiparty fair exchange (MPFE):
Participants P1 · · ·PN
Input 〈 d1 · · ·dN 〉, π : {1 · · ·N} → {1 · · ·N}
Output 〈 out1 · · · outN 〉
Requirements (fairness) for any honest Pi, outi = dπ(i)
Here, π is a permutation indicating how the items are to be transferred; the
item owned by Pπ(i) is desired by and should be given to Pi. In its most
general form, the fair exchange problem allows every participant to obtain
items from a set of other participants, not just one. The problem has no
TTP-free solution already for the two-party case [15]. This has been proved
by reduction of 2-party DC to 2-party FE.
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Looking for the ‘weakest’ communication model in which the listed problems
can be solved without TTP will help to clarify their relationship. For example,
it is conjectured [15], that two-party fair exchange is more diﬃcult to solve
than consensus. To prove this, it is enough to ﬁnd a communication model
in which consensus is possible, but fair exchange not. The model we used in
this paper might be a possible answer. Consensus is solvable in this model,
but, at present, we do not have a proof that MPFE is not. We also conjecture
that, because of the presence of the honest veriﬁer, MPCS is not more diﬃcult
than DC.
6 Conclusion
Existent non-probabilistic contract signing protocols make use of a trusted
third party. The main issue addressed in this paper is the transfer of trust from
a dedicated trusted third party towards a generic communication medium.
We proposed a reliable communication network and a basic contract signing
protocol built on top of it.
Because of the strong guarantees of the underlying communication model,
our protocol has limited practical use for highly unreliable media like the In-
ternet. There, at least for the moment, the most appropriate contract signing
protocols remain the optimistic ones [2,9], which rely on the presence of a
trusted party ready to be contacted in case of conﬂicts. However, in the con-
text of middleware platforms, the additional network requirements on which
our protocol relies may very well be met.
We have formally proved that the proposed protocol preserves fairness for
any number of participants. Given the simplicity of the protocol and the strong
network assumptions, this will not come as a surprise. However, the proof
provides a starting point for formal veriﬁcation of parametrized multiparty
contract signing protocols. The techniques are promising, but need to be
developed further in order to deal with less abstract, more detailed protocols
that are substantially more complex.
As future work, we plan to analyze other (optimistic) MPCS protocols.
The Baum-Waidner protocol [2], for instance, is symmetric and optimistic,
and therefore a convenient next target for the parametrized veriﬁcation tech-
niques proposed here. Taking inspiration in the solution for MC presented
in [10], we would also like to explicitly deﬁne a MPCS protocol without TTP
in the weaker communication model used there, and under the essential as-
sumption t < 1
3
N .
On the more theoretical side, it would be interesting to investigate the
relations between the problems mentioned in Section 5, by identifying the
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communication models where they are or are not solvable without the inter-
ference of a TTP.
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